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1 Introduction
Citizens’ preferences with regard to income redistribution are of crucial importance for the
political debate as to the future of the welfare state. While the typical right-wing stance is
to decry it as excessive, the left points to pockets of poverty even in rich societies that need
to be eradicated through more redistribution. This paper contributes to this debate by
measuring citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for income redistribution through a Discrete
Choice experiment (DCE) and relating it to a set of behavioral determinants. The data
come from a DCE performed in the fall of 2008 and involving 979 Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution
and its determinants, which will be discussed in Section 2 below. One line of thought
relates the measured amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral
factors. Examples are Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009). However,
the observed amount of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between demand
and supply, with supply governed by a country’s political institutions and processes. This
classical identiﬁcation problem would have to be addressed in order to make inferences
about citizens’ preferences for redistribution. A second direction of research, exempliﬁed
by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to measure
attitudes towards redistribution. The problem with this approach is its failure to impose
a budget constraint. It therefore cannot predict actual decision making (e.g. voting at the
polls), where citizens take the consequences in terms of their own income and wealth into
account. A third approach seeks to solve this problem through Contingent Valuation (CV)
experiments [see e.g. Boeri et al. (2001, 2002)1. The weakness of the CV approach is that
it holds all the attributes of the good in question constant, varying its price only. One
would want to vary other attributes of redistribution besides its tax price, viz. its uses (for
1Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also perform CV experiments that
impose an explicit trade-oﬀ between income and social insurance coverage on respondents. They ﬁnd that
people oppose an extension of the welfare state, with conﬂicts between young and old, rich and poor, and
insiders and outsiders creating signiﬁcant hurdles to welfare reform.
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health, old age, etc.) and the type of beneﬁciary (foreigner, national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows measurement of preferences uncontaminated by
supply inﬂuences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it
does so in a realistic way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all
attributes are allowed to vary.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its ﬁrst part concerns general de-
terminants of the demand for redistribution and the second, its behavioral determinants, in
particular, religious denomination, religiosity, and beliefs about the role of luck in achieving
economic success. Section 3 presents a general description of the method of DCEs as well
as the design of the present experiment. The descriptive statistics of the experiment follow
in Section 4, and hypothesis tests, in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results and
concludes with summarizes the results and concludes with suggestions for future research.
2 Literature review and statement of hypotheses
This section ﬁrst presents research that deﬁnes the general background of this paper and
then moves on to contributions that lead to a set of speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested.
2.1 General determinants of the demand for income redistribu-
tion
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide
set of factors that can be categorized as economic, political, and behavioral determinants
of the demand for income redistribution.
The simplest framework for the analysis of purely economic determinants is provided by
a model focusing on current economic well-being, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981) [RRMR model]. This model
assumes non-altruistic utility-maximizing individuals diﬀerentiated by their income levels
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only. The government pays a lump-sum transfer to all citizens, ﬁnanced by a linear uniform
income tax. Individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation and transfers while
those with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political equilibrium, the majority
of voters supports a positive tax rate corresponding to the value desired by the median
voter. The model’s prediction is that the larger the gap between the mean and the median
income, the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) ﬁnd some supporting evidence. Fur-
thermore, Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four
EU countries, shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redis-
tribution. On the other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez
(1999) fail to ﬁnd supporting evidence for this model. Moreover, Neustadt and Zweifel
(2009) relate willingness to pay (WTP) for income redistribution elicited from a Discrete
Choice Experiment (DCE, see Section 3.1 for details) to measures of economic well-being.
WTP values are negatively related to income and education, contradicting the RRMR
model.
Another economic explanation is the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypoth-
esis, suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) as the ‘tunnel eﬀect’ and more recently
reformulated by Benabou and Ok (2001). It extends the RRMR model by introducing indi-
viduals’ expectations, based on their observations regarding the income mobility of others
in society. Expected upward mobility may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s
enthusiasm for income redistribution.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) who, using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people who
can expect high future income oppose redistribution. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use prob-
abilistic expectations data to show that individuals with a suﬃciently large chance of
occupational upward mobility exhibit a lower demand for redistribution; conversely, those
with a suﬃciently large risk of occupational downward mobility opt for more redistribu-
tion. Checchi and Filippin (2004), testing the POUM hypothesis by means of a within-
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subjects experiment, ﬁnd corroborating evidence under several alternative speciﬁcations.
According to Guillaud (2008), however, individuals who subjectively experienced upward
mobility over ten years tend to be more (rather than less) supportive of redistributive poli-
cies. Moreover, upward intergenerational mobility in occupational prestige goes along with
more positive rather than negative attitude towards redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) examine the empirical evidence for the United States and brieﬂy across countries,
concluding that social mobility (if measured as the change in the occupational prestige)
does decrease demand for redistribution once sociodemographic (age, gender, race) and
socioeconomic characteristics (income, education) are controlled for. In their DCE-based
study, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) relate preferences for redistribution to mobility. They
ﬁnd partial empirical support for the POUM hypothesis.
Another economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that pref-
erences for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as a demand for insurance
by risk-averse individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know
their endowment as well as their future position in society [’veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls
(1999)], they are predicted to exhibit positive WTP for an income transfer from more fa-
vorable future states to less favorable ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted
as reﬂecting this hypothetical demand for insurance. Beck (1994) investigates individual
behavior under the ’veil of ignorance’ in an experiment. By placing participants in a hypo-
thetical society with random diﬀerences in income, represented by lotteries, he is able to
derive the desired amount of income redistribution. Individuals indeed display risk aver-
sion, albeit not of the extreme kind implied by the Rawlsian maximin rule that uses the
maximum improvement of the individual with minimum initial wealth as the sole criterion.
Furthermore, they show no preference for income redistribution in excess of what can be
explained by risk aversion.
As to the political determinants of the demand for income redistribution, literature on
political economy [Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003); Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002)] predicts that proportional representation tends towards universal
programs beneﬁtting various groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.),
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while majority rule results in targeted ”pork barrel” programs. Persson and Tabellini
(2003) ﬁnd supporting empirical evidence in that countries with proportional represen-
tation have GDP shares of government expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 percentage
points higher than countries with majority rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) present
weak evidence of a positive correlation between the degree of proportional representation
and the transfer share in GDP in OECD countries. Additional political determinants of
redistribution include two-party vs. multiparty system, presidential vs. parliamentary
democracy, and direct vs. representative democracy, with two-party systems, presidential,
and direct democracies all predicted to induce less public redistribution. In order to sketch
the institutional background of the DCE described in Section 3.2, Switzerland can be de-
scribed as follows. It has a high degree of proportional representation and a parliamentary
democracy. Its distinguishing feature, however, is its extensive direct democratic control
in the guise of popular initiatives and referenda. This might serve to limit public welfare
spending while enforcing eﬃciency in redistribution [cf. Feld et al. (2007)].
The mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants of preferences for
redistribution calls for a detailed analysis of their behavioral determinants. In particular,
beliefs have been at the center of attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and
Angeletos (2005), who develop a model where society’s belief as to whether eﬀort or luck
determines economic success gives rise to multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria. Benabou and
Tirole (2006) propose a model for the emergence and persistence of such collective beliefs.
Moreover, beliefs can be seen as a source of altruistic preferences and inequality aversion.
On the empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence in line with Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) suggesting that beliefs about the role of luck in determining economic success are an
important determinant of the demand for redistribution. She also considers the eﬀects of
incentives. If eﬀort determines income, then an increased income tax rate causes an output
loss due to its eﬀect on incentives. This consideration is hypothesized to qualify the link
between beliefs and the demand for redistribution. However, the data fail to support this
hypothesis.
While the POUM hypothesis suggests less redistribution than predicted by the RRMR
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model, the assumption of altruistic preferences can lead to the opposite prediction. In fact,
if individuals care also about the utility of others, one might expect more redistribution
than predicted by the conventional RRMR model. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a
review of several models of social preferences, in particular, altruism, envy, inequality
aversion, fairness, and reciprocity. In a simple model of inequality aversion, it is assumed
that individuals feel envy if their incomes are below that of others but they feel altruistic
when their income exceeds it. Consequently, the decisive median voter demands more
redistribution than in the conventional RRMR model.
Based on the assumption of inequality aversion, Neustadt and Zweifel (2010b) formu-
late two hypotheses to be tested. The ﬁrst predicts that the citizens with higher inequality
aversion exhibit a positive WTP for redistribution while those with lower inequality aver-
sion, a negative one. The second hypothesis is based on the consideration that voters
exhibiting inequality aversion tend to support the view that the government should reduce
the income gap between rich and poor. Consequently, respondents who state that the
reduction of the income gap is a task of the government are expected to exhibit a positive
WTP for redistribution.
2.2 Religious beliefs and demand for income redistribution
There exists a great deal of theoretical literature dealing with religious beliefs as a deter-
minant of demand for income redistribution, all of them predicting a negative relationship
between the degree of religiosity and demand for income redistribution.
In particular, Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theory of collective beliefs, based
on endogenous complementarities between individual cognitive choices that arise naturally
from the interaction of psychological motives and economic rationality. In a simple model,
they analyze an important class of religious beliefs that are linked to the ’Protestant work
ethic’, namely to a belief that there is a world to come, in which rewards and punishments
depend on the eﬀort and industriousness of a person during his lifetime2. Alternative
2cf. Weber (1920)
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beliefs can be of two kinds: (i) a belief that there is no afterlife (atheism or agnosticism);
(ii) a belief that there is afterlife but its rewards are not related to eﬀorts in the current
world but might be subject to observance of commandments, good deeds towards other
people etc. Thus, the more religious (in the sense of the ’Protestant work ethic’) a citizen
is, the more eﬀort he exerts. Thus, a more religious individual prefers lower tax rates in
order to avoid income redistribution in favor of the less religious citizens who do not work
as hard. If a low tax rate decided upon by a majority of religious citizens is anticipated by
the population, individuals become more religious since the belief that hard work leads to
rewards in afterlife generates higher utility given low income redistribution. Conversely, if
a majority of citizens who happen to be less religious votes for a high level of redistribution,
it can become proﬁtable to invest in the non-religious beliefs and thus to exert less eﬀort.
In sum, two equilibria are possible:
(i) An equilibrium with a high level of religiosity in the sense of the ’Protestant work
ethic’, implying a high level of work eﬀort and a low level of income redistribution.
(ii) An equilibrium with a low level of religiosity or a predominance of non-Protestant
beliefs, implying a low level of work eﬀort and a high level of income redistribution.
Moreover, Scheve and Stasavage (2006a,b) propose a model of religious participation as
a substitute for insurance against adverse events. Therefore risk-averse religious individuals
desire less demand for redistribution as a collective insurance device, resulting again in a
negative predicted relationship between religiosity and redistribution.
A further strand of literature, based on preferences rather than beliefs, argues that pub-
lic redistribution crowds out religious participation and charitable activities, giving once
more rise to a negative correlation. Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007)
ﬁnd evidence that public insurance spending indeed crowds out religious charitable spend-
ing. Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) empirically relate the amount of public social expenditure
to the strength of religious orientation for the OECD countries. They show that the par-
tial correlation between religiosity and the share of transfers in GDP is clearly negative,
supporting the theories expounded above. Moreover, Switzerland shares the somewhat
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guarded attitudes prevailing in the EU rather than the highly religious attitudes of the
U.S. population. Being located close to the regression line, Switzerland provides addi-
tional evidence supporting the theoretical arguments relating religion to redistribution.
Based on the theoretical arguments of Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Scheve and
Stasavage (2006a,b), we formulate two hypotheses to be tested in Section 5.2. The ﬁrst
predicts that members of Protestant churches exhibit a negative willingness to pay (WTP)
for redistribution while members of other denominations (who do not share the Protestant
work ethic but still strongly participate in and proﬁt from private charity), a higher but
still a negative one. By way of contrast, citizens with no aﬃliation at all who presumably
share atheistic or agnostic beliefs are predicted to exhibit a strictly positive WTP for
redistribution. The second hypothesis predicts the WTP for redistribution to fall with a
higher level of religiosity of the individual, alternatively measured as (a) strength of the
belief in God, (b) frequency of attending religious services.
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(A) negative if the individual belongs to a Protestant church,
(B) negative but less so than in (A) if the individual belongs to a religious denomi-
nation other than Protestant,
(C) positive if the individual is unaﬃliated.
Hypothesis 2: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) a stronger belief in God,
(b) more frequent attendance of religious services.
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2.3 Beliefs about the role of luck and eﬀort and demand for
income redistribution
The Benabou-Tirole model (see Section 2.2) suggests that beliefs about the role of eﬀort in
determining economic success or intertemporal utility are an important determinant of the
preferences for redistribution. The conviction that high income and wealth are the result
of work eﬀort (belief in a just world) goes along with a low level of income redistribution.
Conversely, a society that believes that luck, connections, social capital inherited from one’s
parents, and corruption (realistic pessimism) determine income and wealth is expected to
choose a high degree of redistribution, ﬁnanced by high taxes, see also Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005). In their model of collective beliefs, Benabou and
Tirole (2006) derive two possible equilibria with respect to the belief in a just world:
(i) An equilibrium with optimistic beliefs in a just world and a laissez-faire society arises
in a population where the majority of citizens tries to ignore discouraging news about
the eﬃcacy of the individual eﬀort. In turn, the majority chooses a relatively low
tax rate with little redistribution and thus has strong incentives to believe that the
world is indeed just.
(ii) An equilibrium with pessimistic beliefs and a welfare state arises in a population
where the majority takes seriously all discouraging news about the eﬃcacy of the
individual eﬀort. Thus, the majority chooses a high tax rate with a high level of
redistribution.
Empirical evidence suggests that beliefs sharply diﬀer between the United States and
the EU. Most Americans believe that anyone can get out of poverty by hard work and that
the poor remain poor only because they refuse to make the eﬀort. By way of contrast,
Europeans generally think that poverty is due to bad luck and not the individual’s respon-
sibility. Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) measure the willingness-to-pay for justice in the
United States using dictator games. Dictators were given $10 to split between themselves
and recipients. The authors ﬁnd that one third of the dictators are willing to pay one
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dollar out of ten for obtaining the information whether poverty was due to disability or
substance abuse. Finally, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) show that a history of misfortune in
the recent past such as unemployment and personal trauma makes people more risk-averse
and less optimistic about upward mobility. These changes in beliefs are found to have a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on redistribution.
Therefore, the Benabou-Tirole model suggests that equilibrium (i) with a laissez-faire
society is likely to persist in the United States while equilibrium (ii) with a full-ﬂedged
welfare state is sustainable in Europe. Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) relate the amount of public
social spending to a score that ranges from 1 (hard work always brings a better life) to
10 (hard work does not bring any success) using data from OECD countries. The U.S.
score is closest to 1 but lies below the regression line, while Germany and Denmark mark
the other extreme. Again, as in the case of religiosity, this regression is one of two best-
ﬁtting bivariate regressions designed to explain the share of transfers in GDP. Here again,
Switzerland as a test case lies right near the regression line, lending additional support to
the hypothesis.
Based on the presented literature review we state Hypothesis 3 to be tested in Section
5.2 as follows.
Hypothesis 3: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to increase with a
stronger individual belief that luck rather than eﬀort determine economic success.
3 Discrete choice experiments
3.1 Theoretical foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ preferences
for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction to classical
Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals
to express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a
DCE, respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical
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alternatives deﬁned by their attributes including a price. By varying the levels of attributes,
diﬀerent product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always choose the
alternative with the highest utility. From the observed choices, the researcher can infer
the utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from the New
Demand Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere et al.
(2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain
situation or product is described in detail, and respondents are asked to indicate their
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for this ﬁxed product. Only its price attribute is
varied, while in Conjoint Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making
it a multi-attribute valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes
the product in less detail than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product
varieties by varying the levels of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-
oﬀs among attributes can be explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes
estimated separately (see below). Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less
likely than in CV with its exclusive emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior.
Finally, biases that easily occur when individuals are directly asked about their WTP are
less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan (2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly
impose the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of
income used to ﬁnance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultane-
ously choose this share and hence the ’size of the pie’ and the ’slices of the pie’ devoted
to diﬀerent types of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.; see Exhibits No. 1 to 3 in
Appendix). Thus, trade-oﬀs among diﬀerent attributes of the redistribution plan can be
calculated to assess the relative importance of the respective redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974, 1981, 2001)]. Individual 푖 values alter-
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native 푗 according to the utility 푉푖푗 attained, which is given by
푉푖푗 = 푣푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖, 휀푖푗). (1)
Here, 푣푖(⋅) denotes 푖’s indirect utility function, 푎푗 , the amount of attributes associated with
alternative 푗, and 푝푗 , price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by 푦푖 and 푠푖, respectively. Finally, 휀푖푗 denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering 푣푖, imparting
a stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split
into a systematic component 푤(⋅) and a stochastic one,
푉푖푗 = 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗.
A utility-maximizing individual 푖 will prefer alternative 푗 to alternative 푙 if and only if
푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗. (2)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability 푃푖푗 of individual 푖 choosing
alternative 푗 rather than alternative 푙 can be estimated, with
푃푖푗 = Prob [푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗 ] (3)
= Prob [휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)] . (4)
Thus, the probability of choosing 푗 amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
diﬀerence 푤푖[푗] − 푤푖[푙] dominating the ’noise’, 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 . By the central limit theorem,
the error terms {휀푖푙, 휀푖푗} can be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variances 휎2푙 and 휎
2
푗 as well as covariance 휎푙푗 . Under these assumptions, 휑푖푗 := 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 is
also normally distributed with mean zero and variance 휎2 := Var[휑푖푗] = 휎
2
푙 + 휎
2
푗 − 2휎푙푗 .
Thus, equation (4) can be represented as
푃푖푗 = Φ
(
푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)
휎
)
, (5)
where Φ(⋅) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher et al. (1999) provide
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empirical evidence that a linear speciﬁcation of the function 푤(⋅) leads to good predictions
in its middle ranges. Therefore, in the case of the simple model that relates utilities and
choice probabilities to the attributes only (see Section 5.1), one posits
푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘푎푘푗 + 휀푖푗, (6)
where 푐푖 represents an individual-speciﬁc constant, 푎푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the attributes of
the alternative, and 훽푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the parameters to be estimated. These parame-
ters can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes.
One obtains the following expression representing the diﬀerence in utility of individual 푖
between alternative 푗 and status quo,
Δ푉푖푗 = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘Δ푎푘푗 + 훽푝Δ푝푗 + 휑푖푗, (7)
where Δ푎푘푗 = 푎푘푗 − 푎푙푗, Δ푝푗 = 푝푗 − 푝푙, 푐푖 = 푐푖푙 − 푐푖푗, and 휑푖푗 = 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 for each 푗 ∕= 푙. The
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes 푚 and 푛 is given by
MRS푚,푛 = −
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푎푛
. (8)
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute 푎푚 can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context,
the income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]:
MWTP(푎푚) =
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푝푗
. (9)
For econometric inference, it is important to recall that the same individual makes
several choices. The two-way random-eﬀect speciﬁcation takes this into account with 휑푖푗 =
휇푖+휂푖푗 , where 휇푖 denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across
the choice alternatives. The terms 휇푖 and 휂푖푗 are assumed uncorrelated with the product
attributes (푎푖1, . . . , 푎푖퐾) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit
model, 휎휂 = 1. Hence Var[휑푖푗 ] = 휎
2
휂 + 휎
2
휇 = 1 + 휎
2
휇 and Corr[휑푖푗, 휑푖푙] =
휎2휇
1+휎2휇
=: 휌. The
parameter 휌 indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated
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with each other, or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by
individual-speciﬁc error term. The random-eﬀects speciﬁcation is justiﬁed if 휌 is high and
signiﬁcant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g.
income group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted
with the product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model
speciﬁcation which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses
1 to 3 in Section 5.2. By means of a 푡 test we can investigate whether the diﬀerences in
marginal WTP values between diﬀerent socioeconomic groups are statistically signiﬁcant.
The computation of the variance of the marginal WTP values is performed by the delta
method, cf. Hole (2007).
3.2 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted with a representative sample of 979 respondents in the fall
of 2008. Initially, the respondents were provided with full decision sets including graphical
representations of the status quo and alternatives and were asked to submit their binary
choices during a telephone survey. In order to make sure that decisions were based on a
homogeneous information set and made in a consistent way, the respondents additionally
received a detailed description of the attributes and their possible realizations. The Ap-
pendix shows the graphical representation of the status quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected
alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3). The data collection followed in a telephone survey some
days later and additionally included a questionnaire covering a wide range of socioeconomic
and behavioral characteristics of the respondents.
Prior to the experiment, the attributes and their levels used to deﬁne ’income redistri-
bution’ had been checked in two pretests for their relevance. Attributes form four groups
(see Table 1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on ﬁve types of recipients (viz.
the working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
∙ Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
∙ Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
∙ Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
∙ People with Ill Health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
∙ Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
∙ Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
people with ill health);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on three groups (viz. Swiss
citizens, western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, deﬁned as a share of GDP;
4. Personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible sce-
narios that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios deﬁne the 푛 rows of the
observation matrix 푋 , with associated covariance matrix Ω = 휎2 (푋 ′푋)−1 of parameters
훽 to be estimated. So-called 퐷-eﬃcient design calls for the minimization of the geometric
mean of the eigenvalues of Ω,
퐷 eﬃciency =
(
∣Ω∣
1
퐾
)
−1
where 퐾 denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the num-
ber of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split into ﬁve groups. One alternative
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was included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices
per respondent.
In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set
and made in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the
attributes and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the graphical representation
of the status quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3).
4 Descriptive statistics
4.1 Socioeconomic characteristics
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-
speaking part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent
were born in the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income be-
low CHF 2,000 and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reﬂecting the structure of the Swiss
population. However, only 1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
Religious denomination No. % of valid answers
Roman Catholic Church 383 39
Reformed Church 494 51
Unaﬃliated 80 8
Other 19 2
Total valid answers 976 100
Missing 3
Sample 979
Table 2: Religious denomination of the respondents
39 percent of the respondents are members of the Roman Catholic Church while 51
percent belong to the Reformed Church3. An additional 2 percent are members of other
religious denominations while 8 percent are not aﬃliated [see Table 2]. As to the strength
3Largest Protestant denomination in Switzerland.
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strength of the belief No. % of valid answers
no or weak belief 382 39
moderate belief 384 39
strong or very strong belief 209 22
total valid answers 975 100
missing 4
sample 979
Table 3: Level of respondents’ religiosity measured as strength of their belief in God
Last attendance No. % of valid answers
less than 1 month ago 236 27
1 to 2 months ago 193 22
3 to 6 months ago 236 27
more than 6 months ago 205 24
total valid answers 870 100
Missing 109
Sample 979
Table 4: Level of respondents’ religiosity measured by time of their last attendance of a
religious service
of religious beliefs, 39 percent indicated no or weak belief in God as well as moderate belief
while 22 percent of respondents claimed to have a strong or a very strong belief in God [see
Table 3]. Moreover, 27 percent of respondents attended a religious service at least once
in the last month. Individuals’ shares whose last service attendance was 1 to 2 months
ago and 3 to 6 months ago made up 27 and 22 percent, respectively [see Table 4]. Finally,
24 percent stated not having attended a service within the last 6 months. However, the
number of missing answers with 109 is unusually high, probably due to the fact that many
individuals who never attended a religious service preferred to refuse their answers.
Table 5 shows the distribution of answers to the question, “Is work eﬀort or luck and
connections more important for economic success?”, with step 1 indicating the belief that
work eﬀort alone determines success, and step 10, the opposite belief that work eﬀort does
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No. % of valid answers
steps 1 to 2 247 25
step 3 226 23
steps 4 to 5 389 40
steps 6 to 10 112 12
total valid answers 974 100
Missing 5
Sample 979
Table 5: Belief whether eﬀort or luck determine economic success on a scale from 1 to 10.
Step 1 indicates the belief that only eﬀort determines success, step 10 indicates the belief
that only luck determines success.
not matter at all. The majority of respondents seem to believe in the role of eﬀort. In fact,
25 percent of respondents placed themselves on steps 1 or 2, 23 percent, on step 3, and
16 percent, on step 4. As much as 24 percent chose step 5 while only 12 percent placed
themselves on steps 6 to 10.
4.2 Respondents’ choice behavior
There is a total of 979⋅8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which not quite 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo [see Table 6]. There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes
in the experiment may not have been suﬃciently spaced apart to make respondents switch.
Second, some attributes (e.g. beneﬁts going to the unemployed; see Table 8), may not have
been important enough to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making
because the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However,
there may simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making
situations, as suggested by the large negative constant in Table 8. Nonetheless, only 21
percent of respondents never opted for an alternative [see Table 6]. Conversely, almost 80
percent departed from the status quo at least once.
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Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 6: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 7: Distribution of the number of chosen alternatives per respondent
5 Estimation results
5.1 Simple model: preferences of an average respondent
Estimation of equation (7) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of the
indirect utility function with regard to the GDP share of redistribution REDIST. More-
over, the fact that uses and types of beneﬁciaries add up to 100 percent needs to be taken
into account [see Table 1]. In order to avoid perfect collinearity, PENS (Pensioners) and
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Variable Coeﬀ. Std. err. 푧 푃 > ∣푧∣ Marg. eﬀ.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
휒2(0) 108.87
Prob > 휒2 0.000
휎푢 0.41610
휌 0.14759
Table 8: Random eﬀects probit estimates for the simple model
OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
Δ푉 = 푐0 + 훽1W POOR+ 훽2UNEMP+ 훽3ILL + 훽4FAM+
+훾1SWISS + 훾2WEU FOR+ (10)
+훿1REDIST+ 훿2REDIST
2 + 휂TAX + 휑
Estimation of a few of the 5 ⋅ 3 = 15 speciﬁcations with alternative exclusions produced
results similar to those displayed in Table 8. Speciﬁcally, they agree in that alternatives
with additional redistribution are chosen with a lower probability [for details with regard
to ’slices’ of the pie, see Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a)]. Also, note the sizeable and highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the price attribute TAX, which is important for the estimation of
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) values [see eq. (9)]. For redistribution, the MWTP
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value is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂Δ푉/∂REDIST
∂Δ푉/∂TAX
= −
훿1 + 2훿2REDIST
휂
(11)
This amounts to -0.25 percentage points of income share per additional percentage point of
GDP devoted to redistribution in excess of the status quo. Evaluated at the mean personal
income of the sample, this equals CHF -11.78 per month. However, this ﬁgure is dwarfed
by the compensation one would have to pay respondents to depart from the status quo,
amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their monthly income, or 5.27 percent of their
annual income [see the large negative constant in Table 8].
Neustadt and Zweifel (2010b) construct the (quadratic) WTP function and show that it
attains a maximum at 21.05% of GDP, deﬁnitely below the current value of 25%. Therefore,
they argue that Swiss welfare state is too big in the light of average citizens’ preferences.
5.2 Extended model: preference heterogeneity
5.2.1 Religious denomination and preferences for redistribution
The simple model is now extended by including dummies for the religious denomination
[see Table 2]. The four levels of this variable are represented by three dummy variables,
REF, CATH, and OTH DEN. For instance, the former is deﬁned as
CATH =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if the respondent belongs to the Catholic Church,
0 otherwise.
The reference category is UNAFF (unaﬃliated), indicating that the respondent does not
belong to a religious denomination. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with
religious denomination, eq. (10) is modiﬁed to also contain interaction terms involving the
denomination variables, resulting in
Δ푉 ′ = 푐′0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′
1CATH + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′
2REDIST++훼
′
3REDIST
2 + . . .
+휆′2REDIST ⋅CATH + 휆
′
3REDIST
2 ⋅CATH + . . .
+휆′4REDIST ⋅REF+ 휆
′
5REDIST
2 ⋅REF+
+휆′6REDIST ⋅OTH DEN+ 휆
′
7REDIST
2 ⋅OTH DEN+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휑′.
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exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
Catholics - -0.32857 -15.44 7.34 ***
Reformed - -0.47866 -21.33 11.24 ***
Unaﬃliated + 0.71988 37.77 9.77 ***
Others -1.15630 -49.30 86.45
Note: *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with religious denominations
Hypothesis 1(A) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative for
the respondents belonging to the Reformed Church. It is conﬁrmed, with the MWTP for
one percentage point increase of the total amount of redistribution being a negative CHF
-15.44 [see Table 9]. Hypothesis 1(B), stating that Catholics exhibit a negative demand
for redistribution that is, however, higher than that of the Protestants is conﬁrmed, too.
However, a 푡 test shows that the diﬀerence in MWTP values between these two religious
groups is statistically not signiﬁcant. Further, Hypothesis 1(C), predicting the demand
for redistribution of unaﬃliated citizens to be positive ﬁnds strong empirical support with
the corresponding MWTP of CHF 37.77 for one percentage point increase of the total
amount of redistribution. Moreover, 푡 tests conﬁrm that MWTP values of the unaﬃliated
individuals on the one side and Catholics or Reformed on the other side are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent (with 푡 values of 4.35 and 3.97, respectively).
5.2.2 Religiosity and preferences for redistribution
In this section, the simple model is extended by one of two measures of religious partici-
pation by including the corresponding dummies [see Tables 3, 4]. For instance, in the case
of the strength of religious beliefs, the three levels of this variable are represented by two
dummy variables, namely WEAK (no or weak belief in God) and STRONG (strong or
23
very strong belief), with the former being deﬁned as
WEAK =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if the respondent has no or weak belief in God,
0 otherwise.
Here, the reference category is MODER, indicating that the respondent stated having
beliefs of moderate strength. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with reli-
gious denomination, eq. (10) is modiﬁed to also contain interaction terms involving the
denomination variables, resulting in
Δ푉 ′′ = 푐′′0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′
1WEAK + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′
2REDIST+
+훼′′3REDIST
2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휅′′2REDIST ⋅WEAK+
+휅′′3REDIST
2 ⋅WEAK+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+
+휅′′4REDIST ⋅ STRONG+
+휅′′5REDIST
2 ⋅ STRONG+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휑′′
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
no or weak belief -0.47477 -20.67 12.75 **
moderate belief -0.42066 -19.33 7.93 ***
strong belief 0.24983 12.83 8.56 *
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
Table 10: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with strength of religious beliefs
Hypothesis 2(a) with its focus on the degree of religiosity as a determinant of WTP
for redistribution states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
a stronger belief in God. The estimated WTP values suggest to reject this hypothesis,
however. In fact, the WTP increases with the strength of religious beliefs [see Table 10].
The 푡 test for preference heterogeneity conﬁrms that the WTP of individuals with strong
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beliefs signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the WTP of the other two groups. However, the diﬀerence
between respondents with weak and moderate beliefs, respectively, cannot be shown to be
statistically signiﬁcant.
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
less than 1 month ago (group 1) -0.90140 -38.47 38.43 *
1 to 2 months ago (group 2) -0.35836 -15.54 12.52 *
3 to 6 months ago (group 3) -0.44118 -20.64 10.02 ***
more than 6 months ago (group 4) -0.05989 -2.95 7.38
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
Table 11: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with frequency of attending a religious service
Hypothesis 2(b) states that WTP values are predicted to decrease with a higher fre-
quency of attendance of religious services. In fact, the estimated WTP values [see Table
11] seem to conﬁrm this hypothesis. However, as indicated by the test for heterogeneity,
the conﬁdence intervals of the estimated WTP values overlap, with the notable exception
of group 3 and group 4 exhibiting a weakly signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
5.2.3 Beliefs about the role of luck and eﬀort and preferences for redistribu-
tion
Next, the simple model is extended by including the dummy variables describing the re-
spondents’ beliefs about the role of eﬀort vs. luck for achieving economic success. There
are ﬁve corresponding dummy variables deﬁned as follows: LUCK12 (=1 if the respondent
placed himself on steps 1 or 2 on a scale from 1 to 10, =0 otherwise), LUCK3, (=1 if the
respondent placed himself on step 3, =0 otherwise4), and LUCK6+ (=1 if the respondent
placed himself on steps 6 to 10, thereby indicating a strong belief in luck, =0 otherwise)
as well as their interactions with the attributes. The reference category is LUCK45 (=1
4For the distribution of answers, see Table 5.
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if the respondent placed himself on steps 4 or 5, =0 otherwise). Thus, eq. (10) is modiﬁed
to read,
Δ푉 ′′′ = 푐′′′0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′′
1 LUCK12 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′′
2 REDIST+
+훼′′′3 REDIST
2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휅′′′2 REDIST ⋅ LUCK12 +
+휅′′′3 REDIST
2 ⋅ LUCK12 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휑′′′
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
steps 1 or 2 (group I) -0.74183 -32.92 13.25 ***
step 3 (group II) -0.59576 -27.23 13.63 ***
steps 4 or 5 (group III) -0.06592 -3.08 8.12
steps 6 to 10 (group IV) 0.71922 35.15 11.83 ***
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
Table 12: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with beliefs as to whether eﬀort or luck de-
termine economic success. A higher step indicates a weaker belief in a just world and a
stronger belief in luck.
Hypothesis 3 states that the demand for redistribution is predicted to increase with a
stronger belief that luck determines economic success. Therefore, respondents who chose
higher steps on a scale from 1 to 10 are expected to exhibit higher WTP values. As
indicated by the estimation results presented in Table 12, this hypothesis is conﬁrmed.
In particular, individuals who placed themselves on steps 6 to 10, thereby indicating that
they deem luck and connections to be crucial in the determination of income and wealth,
exhibit a strongly positive marginal WTP value of CHF 35.15 for a 1 percentage point
increase in the amount of redistribution as a share of GDP. The corresponding MWTP
values for other groups, while being negative, do increase with higher steps. Furthermore,
the 푡 test results conﬁrm that all diﬀerences between the MWTP values of the four groups
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are signiﬁcant, the only exception being the diﬀerence between group I (steps 1 or 2) and
group II (step 3), both believing in a just world.
6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution through
a Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on a simple model that relates
choices to the attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen would have to be
paid a compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.25 percent of monthly
income) for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In
addition, a very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another
63 percent of monthly income.
Furthermore, we tested several hypotheses concerning the behavioral determinants of
the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side inﬂuences. In partic-
ular, Hypothesis 1 states that it is negative among church members and positive among
those without religious aﬃliation. An extended model that includes the pertinent vari-
able indicating religious denomination as a regressor yields conﬁrming evidence for this
statement; however, the additional prediction that Protestants exhibit a lower WTP than
Catholics ﬁnds only partial support with the respective diﬀerence between the WTP values
being statistically not signiﬁcant. Hypothesis 2 predicts that more religious citizens who
are more likely to engage in private charity and frequently consider religion as a means
of insurance (crowding-out eﬀect) demand a lower level of public redistribution. Here,
the extended version of the model (in both alternative versions) does not support the hy-
pothesis. Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts that citizens with a strong belief that luck rather
than eﬀort determine economic success exhibit a higher WTP. The corresponding extended
model that includes the stated belief about the role of luck as a determinant of income
and wealth conﬁrms this hypothesis. In fact, Hypothesis 3 is the most successful one in
predicting the citizens’ demand for redistribution, providing corroborating evidence for the
theoretical model of collective beliefs developed by Benabou and Tirole (2006).
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The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, only some
behavioral explanations of the demand for redistribution were tested while others (risk
aversion, inequality aversion) were not controlled for. Furthermore, as suggested by re-
cent contributions to literature in the ﬁeld of public choice, citizens’ preferences can be
importantly inﬂuenced by political institutions, in particular by party programs [see e.g.
Schla¨pfer et al. (2007)]. Thus, future work should be devoted to a detailed analysis of indi-
viduals’ political preferences in order to ﬁnd out whether these factors also inﬂuence stated
WTP for redistribution. This analysis would, however, require addressing the identiﬁca-
tion problem once again, since the supply of public redistribution is governed by political
institutions. Second, the status quo bias found in this paper calls for more detailed analy-
sis. To the extent that it reﬂects risk aversion, it should induce demand for redistribution
- contrary to the results presented here. One possible explanation why the status quo bias
is so high can be the fact that there are some preferences that are not fully formed [see e.g.
Stutzer et al. (2007)]. Another possible explanation might be the redistribution illusion,
namely the fact that some respondents are not aware of the actual status quo. Finally,
our evidence only relates to a point of time in one country and thus may be subject to
transitory shocks and country-speciﬁc inﬂuences. Still, by appealing to citizens’ stated
preferences, the present contribution sheds some light on the question whether religious
and cultural beliefs can explain preferences for income redistribution.
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A Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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